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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
The Admissibility of Former Testimony in Civil and
Criminal Trials
By Act 87 of 19561 the Louisiana legislature instructed the
Louisiana Law Institute to prepare a projet for a Code of Evi-
dence for both criminal and civil cases. The purpose of this
Comment is to discuss what disposition should be made in the
new code with regard to the admissibility of former testimony.
Broadly speaking, former testimony is testimony from a former
trial or proceeding sought to be admitted in a subsequent trial
or proceeding to show the truth of the matters asserted therein.
Although there is a difference of opinion as to whether former
testimony is an exception to the hearsay rule, the Uniform Rules
of Evidence treat it as an exception and this is the prevailing
view. 2 Whether former testimony does or does not constitute an
exception depends in large measure upon the definition of hear-
say, for under either approach former testimony is admissible
in evidence, assuming the presence of certain requirements
hereafter discussed.
This Comment will not deal with the problem of former testi-
mony which may be admissible under another exception to the
hearsay rule,s or which may be used for some non-hearsay pur-
pose. 4 Although the use of depositions, both those taken for ad-
mission in the instant case and those taken at a preliminary trial,
present many problems similar to those connected with former
testimony, a discussion thereof is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. In determining what Louisiana should do with regard to
former testimony in the proposed Code of Evidence, it will be
helpful to discuss the present Louisiana law and to compare it
with that of other states and the proposed Uniform Rules.5
1. "Section 2. The Louisiana State Law Institute is instructed to prepare a
comprehensive projet for a Louisiana Code of Evidence, covering the rules of evi-
dence for both criminal and civil cases."
2. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63 defines hearsay as "evidence of a state-
ment which is made other than by a witness while testifying at the hearing offered
to prove the truth of the matter stated."
3. For example, former testimony given by the defendant in a criminal trial
may be considered an admission and be admissible under that exception to the
hearsay rule.
4. If the purpose was merely to show what was said in the former testimony
for the purpose of proving perjury, it would be admissible for a non-hearsay pur-
pose.
5. The Uniform Rules of Evidence drafted by the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by the American Bar Association
was the result of a request by the American Law Institute to review and revise
the Model Code of Evidence drafted by the Law Institute. It was later decided
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Louisiana and the Common Law
Prior to the adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure in
1928, it appears that in general Louisiana followed the common
law rules of evidence in both civil and criminal cases.6 With the
adoption of the Code of Criminal Procedure there was a codifi-
cation and to some extent a modification of the rules of evidence
applicable in criminal cases. The extent of the application of this
code in civil cases is a matter of some doubt.7 Although the Code
of Criminal Procedure provides that hearsay evidence is inadmis-
sible, "except as otherwise provided in this code,"8 no provision
is made with respect to the admissibility of former testimony.
Although it can be argued that this omission excludes former
testimony in criminal cases, this contention has never been con-
sidered in the opinions and decisions of the appellate courts. In
that the project should go ahead as an independent undertaking, using the Model
Code as the basis for the preparation of the Uniform Rules. It was felt by the
Commissioners that the Model Code in its departures from tradition and generally
prevailing common law and statutory rules of evidence was too far reaching and
drastic for present day acceptance and should be modified to present an acceptable
and uniform set of rules. It should be noted that no special effort has been made
to relate the rules of admissibility to all possible limitations arising out of consti-
tutional requirements of due process, personal security, and the like.
Rule 511 of the American Law Institute Model Code of Evidence provides:
"Evidence of a hearsay statement which consists of testimony given by the de-
clarant as a witness in an action is admissible for any purpose for which the testi-
mony was admissible in the action in which the testimony was given, unless the
judge finds that the declarant is available as a witness and in his discretion rejects
the evidence." Under this rule identity of issues and identity of parties are elim-
inated because the testimony is admissible for any purpose for which it was ad-
missible in the prior action. Where the witness is available the judge may or may
not reject the evidence. The discretion of the judge and the relevancy of the testi-
mony seem to be the only safeguards to prevent any testimony taken under oath
from being used.
6. See Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 568 (1954), wherein it is stated
that from the delivery of Louisiana to the United States in 1803, until 1805, the
complete body of Spanish law of evidence was theoretically in force. In 1805 the
crimes act and the code act came into effect and in 1808 the Civil Code was
adopted. These acts and the code contained certain rules of evidence, some of
which were based on the common law, but there were still no express provisions
for such matters as the exclusion of hearsay, cross-examination, and the various
privileges. In 1811, the court was considering common law evidence authorities
in a civil case without any discussion as to the appropriateness of the common law
in this field. In 1819 in Planters Bank v. George, 6 Mart.(O.S.) 670 (La. 1819),
the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the Spanish law had been repealed by
common consent and that the common law rules of evidence should be followed in
civil cases. Livingston's proposed Code of Evidence, in 1833, was based on the
common law rules of evidence, although he did not state that these rules were then
in use in Louisiana nor did he disagree with the Planters Bank case. The courts
continued to apply common law evidence rules until the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure in 1928. Since common law rules of evidence are in general
the same for civil and criminal actions, and our Supreme Court so held, it seems
certain, then, that prior to 1928, Louisiana civil and criminal evidence rules were
generally the same.
7. See Comment, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 568, 582 (1954).
8. LA. R.S. 15:434 (1950).
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view of the acceptance of this exception in other jurisdictions,
plus the recognition by Louisiana courts of many more excep-
tions than those in the code, it seems doubtful that the court
would consider this position tenable. It appears that in both
criminal and civil cases the courts of Louisiana are in general
looking to the common law with regard to the admissibility of
former testimony, notwithstanding the adoption of the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
In dealing with former testimony there is always the prob-
lem of proof of this testimony. Generally a copy of the stenog-
raphic report of the entire'testimony from a former trial, certi-
fied by the stenographer as being a true and correct transcript
of his notes, is competent evidence. 9 The notes are inadmissible
if the stenographer is unable to testify that the notes are sub-
stantially correct.1 0 However, stenographic notes, whether offi-
cial or private, are neither exclusive nor preferred evidence of
the former testimony."1 A judge, juror, witness, stenographer,
attorney, or any first hand observer who heard the former testi-
mony may testify to its substance from his unaided memory.
The witness need not give the exact words, but must be able to
testify to the substance of the testimony. 12 If needed, this ob-
server may also use the judge's notes, counsel's notes, or sten-
ographer's notes to refresh his present memory.' "
Elements far Admissibility
Availability. Before former testimony may be introduced the
witness must be proven to be unavailable for production in per-
son at the subsequent trial.14 A re-examination of the witnesses
9. See State v. Bolden, 109 La. 484, 33 So. 571 (1903) ; State v. Banks, 106
La. 480, 31 So. 53 (1901); Conway v. Erwin, 1 La. Ann. 391 (1846); Rierdon
v. Thompson, 5 La. 364 (1833).
10. See Phares v. Barker, 1 Ill. 271 (1871) ; Baltimore v. State, 132 Md. 113,
103 AtI. 426 (1918). See also 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 671, § 1669 (3d ed. 1940) ;
79 A.L.R. 1408 (1932) ; 15 A.L.R. 541 (1921) ; 20 Am. JUR. 597, § 712 (1939).
11. See Maxwell v. Wilmington City Ry., 40 Atl. 945 (Dela. Super. 1893);
State v. Bixby, 27 Wash.2d 144, 177 P.2d 689 (1947). See also MCCORMICK, EvI-
DENCE 498, § 2.37 (1954) ; 5 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE 671 (3d ed. 1940) ; 20 AM. Jun.
596, § 710 (1939).
12. See Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U.S. 693 (1878) ; State v. Banks, 111 La. 22,
35 So. 370 (1903); Scoville v. Hannibal & St. J.R.R., 94 Mo. 84, 6 S.W. 654
(1830). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 498, § 2.37 (1.954) ; 20 AM. 'Jun. 596,
§ 710 (1939).
13. Ruch v. Rock Island, 97 U.S. 693 (1878) ; Carpenter v. Tucker, 98 N.C.
316, 35 S.E. 83.1 (1887) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 499, § 237 (1954).
14. State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1.928) ; State v. Britton,
131 La. 877, 60 So. 379 (1912) ;State v. Wheat, .1.1 L.a. 800, 35 So. 955 (1903) ;
Succession of l.aipton, 35 l.a. Ann. 418 (1883) ; State v. Granville, 34 La. Ann.
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before the jury whenever possible is preferred. This permits
the opponent to confront and cross-examine the witnesses
against him. In addition the court is able to observe the de-
meanor of the witness. Differences in the skill of cross-exam-
iners and the possibility of discovering new evidence also may
make re-examination of the witness desirable.
Louisiana, along with the common law, has recognized the,
following grounds of unavailability: (1) death;15 (2) loss of
memory because of failure of faculties through disease or- senilr
ity; 16 (3) insanity;17 (4) severe illness or great physical infirm-
ity;18s and (5) permanent or indefinite residence outside the
state.19 Two problems may arise as to the continued applicability
of the fifth ground of unavailability. In criminal cases, under
certain circumstances, it might be possible to force an out-of-
state witness to come and testify. Revised Statutes 15:152 (1)20
1088 (1882); State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann. 1332 (1881); State v. Harvey, 28
La. Ann. 105 (1876) ; Hunter v. Smith, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 351 (La. 1827) ; Williams
v. Jahncke Service, 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1949) ; Citizens Bank v. Jones, 167
So. 511 (La. App. 1936). These cases uniformly hold that for evidence from a
former proceeding to be admitted in a subsequent suit, the witness must be un-
available. This is also the position of the majority of other states. See, e.g.,
Burns v. Leath, 236 Ala. 615, 184 So. 176 (1938) ; Schofield v. Rideout, 238
Wis. 550, 290 N.W. 155 (1940); McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE 492, § 234 (1954).
15. State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955 (1903) ; State v. McNeil, 33 La.
Ann. 1332 (1881) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 492 et seq., § 234 (1954).
16. State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955 (1903) ; State v. New Orleans
Waterworks Co., 107 La. 1, 31 So. 395 (1901) ; Citizens Bank v. Jones, 167 So.
511 (La. App. 1936) ; McCORMICK, EVIDENCE 492 et seq., § 234 (1954).
17. State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) ; State v. Wheat,
III La. 860, 35 So. 955 (19W) ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 492 et seq., § 234 (19.54).
18. State v. Wheat, 111 La. 860, 35 So. 955 (1903); MCCoRMICK, EVIDENCE
492 et seq., § 234 (1954).
19. State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) (sheriff was in-
formed that the witness had permanently departed) ; State v. Britton, 131 La.
877, 60 So. 379 (1912) (if the witness is found out of the state, it must be shown
he is out permanently; here there was no evidence to show the out-of-state wit-
ness, whose new location was known, might not be procured) ; State v. Granville,
34 La. Ann. 1088 (1882) (sheriff reported the witness could not be found);
State v. Harvey, 28 La. Ann. 105 (1876) (witness could not be found); Mc-
CoRMICK, EVIDENCE 492 et seq., § 234 (1954).
20. LA. R.S. 15:152(1) (1950) : "If a person in any state, which by its laws
has made provisions for commanding persons within its borders to attend and
testify in criminal prosecutions or grand jury investigations commenced or about
to commence, in this state is a material witness in a prosecution pending in a
court of record in the county (parish) in which the witness is found.
under the seal of the court stating these facts and specifying the number of days
the witness shall be required. This certificate shall be presented to a judge of a
court of recora.in the county (parish) in which the witness is found.
"If the certificate recommends that the witness be taken into immediate cus-
tody and delivered to an officer of this state to assure his attendance in this
state, the judge may direct that the witness be forthwith brought before him.
The judge being satisfied of the desirability of custody and delivery, for which
determination the certificate shall be prima facie proof, may order the witness
be forthwith taken into custody and delivered to an officer of this state. The
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provides in effect that a material witness to a criminal trial in
Louisiana, who is presently in another state, may be required to
come to Louisiana and testify, if the state in which the witness
is residing is one which has adopted a similar law. Upon certifi-
cation of the court having jurisdiction over the criminal case, the
court having jurisdiction over the witness may order his return.
A Louisiana judge might in his discretion require that the ap-
plication to return the witness be made prior to admission of
former testimony unless the witness cannot be found in his resi-
dent state. In Citizens Bank v. Jones,21 decided subsequent to the
adoption of 15:152(1), the court listed permanent residence
without the state as a ground for unavailability. However, in
that case the witnesses were actually present in court, and the
former testimony was not admitted. In view of the statute, it
seems that the only situations where absence from the state
makes a witness unavailable in a criminal trial are where the
witness cannot be found outside the state or where he is located
in a state not requiring compulsory attendance of witnesses.
In civil cases, those states adopting the Uniform Foreign De-
position Law, including Louisiana, 22 can require the nonresident
witness to give a deposition. Thus it seems that under such cir-
cumstances the witness' deposition could be taken and there
would be no need for the former testimony. This presupposes
the witness could be found in the other state. No cases could be
found which considered the problem of whether depositions
should be used in preference to former testimony. However, as-
suming the deposition would be used whenever possible, to allow
present cross-examination of the witness, the former testimony
seems necessary only where the out-of-state address of the wit-
ness is unknown, or where the state in which the witness resides
has no provision for taking out-of-state depositions.
Some of the common law cases recognize the following addi-
tional grounds of unavailability which have never been passed
order shall be sufficient authority for the officer to take the witness into custody
and hold him unless and until he may be released on bail, recognizance, or order
of the judge issuing the certificate."
21. 167 So. 511 (La. App. 1936).
22. See LA. R.S. 13:3821 (1950): "Whenever any mandate, writ or commis-
sion is issued out of any court of record in any other state or territory, district
or foreign jurisdiction, or whenever upon notice or agreement it is required to
take the testimony of a witness or witnesses in this state, witnesses may be com-
pelled to appear and testify in the same manner and by the same process and pro-
ceedings as may be employed for the purpose of taking testimony in proceedings
in this state." Today practically every state has adopted such a law.
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on by the Louisiana courts: (1) exercise of a privilege or super-
vening disqualification 23 as the privilege of the accused in a
criminal case; (2) residence within the state but beyond the
jurisdiction of the particular court.2 4 The latter seems inap-
plicable in Louisiana because Revised Statutes 15:15225 requires
compulsory attendance of witnesses at all criminal proceedings,
from anywhere in the state, thus eliminating the necessity of for-
mer testimony in criminal cases where the witness is in the
state. In civil cases, Revised Statutes 13:374226 provides for
compulsory taking of depositions in the parish where the wit-
ness resides or such other convenient place fixed by order of the
court. This means the deposition could be taken any time the
witness can be found in the state and used in lieu of former testi-
mony in civil cases. This presupposes that the deposition is
taken in compliance with law for use as testimony in a trial.
With these two provisions there seems to be no necessity for
using former testimony of a witness who can be found anywhere
in the State of Louisiana.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence would qualify the element
of unavailability. Section 63(1)27 provides that hearsay state-
ments are admissible when the witness is present in the court-
room and can be examined. A literal reading of the section
would seem to make former testimony admissible where the wit-
ness is present in the courtroom and can be examined. On the
other hand Section 63 (3)28 allows former testimony only when
23. See Woodward v. State, 21 Ala. App. 417, 109 So. 119 (1926) ; Habig v.
Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935). See also 5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 163-65,
§§1409-1410 (3d ed. 1940).
24. See Toledo Traction Co. v. Cameron, 137 Fed. 48 (Ohio Cir. 1905)
Giverson v. Mills Co., 187 Pa. 513, 41 Atl. 525 (1898). See also McCoRMIoK,
EVIDENCE 492, § 234 (1954).
25. LA. R.S. 15:152 (1950) : "In all prosecutions, witnesses may be compelled
to attend the session of the court from any parish of the state, if the prosecuting
attorney, or any citizen, or the accused, shall state on oath what it is expected to
prove by said witness, and if the judge, upon examination of the case and the
affidavit, shall, in his discretion, determine that the attendance of the witness is
indispensable to the trial; and for that purpose the court before which the prose-
cution is pending may cause to be issued subpoenas and attachments to its of-
ficers, as the case may require."
26. LA. R.S. 13:3742 (1950) : "A witness who is a resident of this state
may be required to attend an examination to take his deposition only in the
parish in which he resides or is employed or transacts his business, or at such
other convenient place as may be fixed by order of court."
27. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(1) : 'A statement previously made by a
person who is present at the hearing and available for cross-examinations with
respect to the. statement and its subject matter, provided the statement would be
admissible if made by declarant while testifying as a witness, is availtble."
28. Id. at 63(3) : "Subject to the same limitations and objections as though
the declarant were testifying in person - (b) if the judge finds that the declarant
19591
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the witness is unavailable. The Uniform Rules do not specify
the:grounds for availability and presumably the same require-
ments of unavailability presently accepted in Louisiana could be
used under that statute.
,Type of Tribunal. In Louisiana generally, in order that for-
mer testimony may be admissible at a subsequent proceeding, it
must have been introduced in the regular course of a trial or
proceeding before a tribunal capable of enforcing the attendance
of witnesses, administering oaths, and employing cross-examina-
tion as a part of its procedure.2 9 It does not appear to be a pre-
requisite that the tribunal be a court of law. The Louisiana Su-
preme Court in State Bar Assn. v. Sackett" held that testimony
before the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of
the Louisiana State Bar Association was admissible in a disbar-
ment proceeding because the defendant was under oath, was rep-
resented by counsel, had the opportunity for cross-examination,
and had the right to subpoena witnesses at the committee hear-
ing. Former testimony from a coroner's inquest has been admit-
ted in evidence at a subsequent trial 1 when there had been
an opportunity for cross-examination. The court in State v.
McNeil3 2 rejected the contention espoused by the district attor-
ney that the preliminary criminal hearing or coroner's inquest
does not have the "dignity nor respect" of a trial. It is submit-
ted that the desirability of these holdings with regard to former
testimony is open to doubt. At a preliminary hearing all that is
invoolved is the sufficiency of evidence for an indictment. Coun-
sel at many of these hearings has not had adequate time to pre-
pare his defense and thus the cross-examination may not have
been sufficient. The Uniform Rules of Evidence contain no pro-
visions as to the type of tribunal before which the former testi-
is; unavailable as a witness at the hearing, testimony given as a witness in another
adtion or in a deposition taken in compliance with law for use as testimony in the
trial of another action, when (i) the testimony is offered against a party who
offered it in his behalf on the former occasion, or against the successor in interest
of such party or (ii) the issue is such that the adverse party on the former oc-
casion had the right and opportunity for cross-examination with an interest and
motive- similar to that which the adverse party has in the action in which the
testimony is offered, is admissible."
I 29. Louisiana State Bar Association v. Sackett, 234 La. 762, 101 So.2d 661
(1958).
,30.-234 La. 762, 101 So.2d 661 (1958).
31. See State v. Parker, 181 La. 635, 160 So. 123 (1935) (the court held that
whe're there was no opportunity for cross-examination at a coroner's inquest such
testimony was inadmissible in a subsequent trial) ; State v. McNeil, 33 La. Ann.
132 (1881).
1 32. 33 La. Ann. 1331, 1332 (1881).
[Vol. -XX
COMMENTS
mony must have been given to qualify for admission and pre-
sumably would neither change nor clarify the present law.!
Oath. In Louisiana, 33 as well as the majority of other states,3 4
the former testimony must have been given under the sanction
of an oath or affirmation. The requirement of an oath is neces-
sary for the assurance it gives that the unavailable witness was
telling the truth at the former proceeding. It is usually a simple
matter to determine whether the testimony was given under oath
or legally sufficient affirmation. The Uniform Rules of Evi-
dence would not change the law in this respect.
Cross-Examination. In Louisiana, for former testimony to be
admissible, there must have been an adequate opportunity at the
prior proceeding to cross-examine the witness.3 5 Since cross-
examination is generally regarded as the highest safeguard for
testing the truth of a witness' testimony, it is frequently stated
that for former testimony to be admissible, it is essential that
there had been opportunity for cross-examination in the prior
proceeding. There is a presumption that the opponent who de-
clines to cross-examine does so due to belief that the testimony
could not or need not be disputed.36 Difficult problems arise as
to the adequacy of the opportunity for prior cross-examination.
Whether the opportunity for cross-examination was adequate is
intertwined with the frequently stated elements of identity of
issues and identity of parties, and will be treated under those
sub-headings.
Identity of Issues. Courts frequently talk of identity of par-
ties and issues in the same breath, and they are difficult to
separate. In many Louisiana cases the courts have stated that
there must be identity of issues.37 However, in no case has the
court refused to admit former testimony for a lack of sufficient
identity in this regard nor have they given any criteria for de-
termining the sufficiency of identity of issues. In Williams v.
33. State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) ; Morace v. Avoyelles
Wholesale Gro., 39 So.2d 105 (La. App. 1948).
34. Habig v. Bastian, 117 Fla. 864, 158 So. 508 (1935); Monahan v. Clemons,
212 Ky. 504, 279 S.W. 974 (1926).
35. State v. Scarborough, 167 La. 484, 119 So. 523 (1928) ; Williams v.
Jahncke Service, 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1949) ; Morace v. Avoyelles Wholesale
Gro., 39 So.2d 105 (La. App. 1948),
36..5 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 51, § 1371 (3d ed. 1940).
37. Williams v. Jahncke Service, 217 La. 1078, 48 So.2d 93 (1950) ; Williams
v. Jahncke Service, 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1949) ; Morace v. Avoyelles Whole-
sale Gro., 39 So.2d 105 (La. App. 1948) ; Young v. Reed, 157 So. 809 (La. App.
1934).
19591
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Jahncke Service38 it was contended that the former testimony
should not have been admitted because there was not identity of
issues. The court of appeal held that although there were differ-
ent incidental issues, the only important issue, i.e., whether the
deceased was intoxicated and attempted to injure or threaten
the witness, was the same in both suits. The case was reversed
by the Supreme Court"9 on other grounds which are discussed
hereafter under "Identity of Parties." In other states the issue
on the occasion when the former testimony was given must have
been substantially the same,40 for otherwise it cannot be sup-
posed that the former statement was sufficiently tested by cross-
examination upon the point then at issue. Without sufficient
identity of issues the cross-examination might have been mainly
to establish some point not at issue at the subsequent proceeding.
Identity of Parties
Reciprocity. At one time both Louisiana 41 and the other
states42 held that for former testimony to be admissible there
must have been reciprocity, that is, that both the party offering
the former testimony in the present suit and the party against
whom the testimony is offered must have been parties in the
prior proceeding or in privity with such parties. Thus the Lou-
isiana court of appeal in Mathes v. Gaines4 said that only testi-
mony of a witness in a previous suit between the same parties
can be used. At common law, in United States v. Aluminum Co.
of America44 the plaintiff in the former suit had been the Fed-
eral Trade Commission and in the second was the United States
Government. The court held there was no reciprocity and thus
the former testimony was inadmissible. The reason for this doc-
trine was that if the party against whom the testimony was of-
fered were seeking to use the same testimony he could not do so,
because the present opponent was not a party to the former suit.
This rule was embedded in the adversary system and apparently
38. 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1949).
39. Williams v. Jahncke Service, 217 La. 1078, 48 So.2d 93 (1950).
40. See Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 357 (1851) ; Woodruff v. State, 61 Ark. 157,
325 S.W. 102 (1895) ; McGivern v. Steele, 197 Mass. 164, 83 N.E. 405 (1908);
Jonescu v. Orlich, 220 Mich. 89, 189 N.W. 919 (1922) ; Taft v. Little, 178 N.Y.
127, 70 N.E. 211 (1904). See also 5 WIGMOBE, EVIDENCE 83-85, § 1387 (3d ed.
1940).
41. Mathes v. Gaines, 127 So. 408 (La. App. 1930).
42. McInturff v. Insurance Co. of North America, 248 Ill. 92, 93 N.E. 369
(1910.) ; Hartis v. Charlotte Elec. Ry., 162 N.C. 236, 78 S.E. 164 (1913) ; Con-
cordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Wise, 114 Okla. 254, 246 Pac. 595 (1926).
43. 127 So. 408 (La. App. 1930).
44. 1 F.R.D. 48 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
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reflected a desire for fairness to all parties involved. 45 This re-
quirement of reciprocity has been modified in many jurisdictions
so that at present it is only the party against whom the former
testimony is now offered whose presence as a party in the pre-
vious suit is significant. The Louisiana Supreme Court in Young
v. Reed46 held that complete mutuality or identity of all parties
is not necessary. It suffices if the party against whom it is of-
fered had full power of cross-examination. Other Louisiana
cases are in accord with this position. 47 Some cases in other
states hold that only the party against whom the testimony is
offered must be the same in both suits. 4 The Uniform Rules of
Evidence would do away with the requirement of reciprocity. 49
Meaning of Identity. In interpreting what is meant by iden-
tity Louisiana courts follow the majority of other state courts.
The rule in Louisiana is that testimony taken in a former pro-
ceeding cannot be admitted in evidence against a party who did
not have full power to cross-examine the witness. Although the
phrase "identity of parties" is used, this has been held to mean
there must be privity between the present and prior parties. The
courts in Louisiana, as in many other states, have attached dif-
ferent meanings to the term privity. In Fuentes v. Gaines5 the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that although the two trials were
not between the same parties, yet if the second trial is between
those who represent the parties to the first by privity in blood,
in law, or in estate, the evidence is admissible. Other Louisiana
courts have discussed privity in terms of identity of interest,
saying that the test is substantial identity of parties, and that
the test is met where both parties had substantially the same
interest and motive in cross-examining.-' This is the position re-
cently taken by the Missouri court in Bartlett v. Kansas City
Public Service Company,52 which held that the person against
45. See McInturff v. Insurance Co. of North America, 248 Ill. 92, 93 N.E.
369 (1910). See also MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE 488, § 232 (1954).
46. 157 So. 809 (La. App. 1934).
47. See Williams v. Jahncke Service, 217 La. 1078, 48 So.2d 93 (1950)
Morace v. Avoyelles Wholesale Gro., 39 So.2d 105 (La. App; 1948).
48. See Wool Insulation Corp. v. Home Insulation, 176 F.2d 502 (10th Cir.
1949) ; School District v. Sachse, 274 Mich. 245, 264 N.W. 396 (1936).
49. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(3): "Testimony given as a witness in
another action -is admissible where the issue is such that the adverse party on
the former occasion had the right and opportunity of cross-examination."
50. 25 La. Ann. 85 (1873).
51. Morace v. Avoyelles Wholesale Gro., 39 So.2d 105 (La. App. 1948) ; Young
v. Reed, 157 So. 809 (La. App. 1934) (if full opportunity of cross-examination is
afforded there does not have to be exact identity of parties).
52. 349 Mo. 13, 160 S.W.2d 740 (1942).
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whom the evidence was offered had an opportunity to cross-
examine the witness with the same interest and motive as the
person against whom the former testimony is now offered. The
latest case in Louisiana is that of Williams v. Jahncke Service
Co. 53 In that case the deceased was killed on the premises of his
employer and his concubine brought suit as beneficiary of a life
insurance policy. A witness for the insurance company testified
that the deceased was intoxicated and provoked the night watch-
man who killed him. This testimony established that the de-
ceased was violating the law at the time of his death, which pre-
vented collection on the insurance policy. Subsequently the con-
cubine filed suit under the workmen's compensation laws as
tutrix of the illegitimate child of the concubine and the deceased.
In the meantime the witness who had given the previous damag-
ing testimony had died. The defendant sought to introduce the
witness' former testimony. The court of appeal, using the same
reasoning as the Missouri court in Bartlett v. Kansas City Pub-
lic Service Co.54 said, "the principle is that when the interest of
the person against whom the testimony Was offered was calcu-
lated to induce equally as thorough a testimony by cross-exami-
nation, then the present opponent has had adequate protection
for the same end and the parties are in privity. It ought then
to be sufficient to inquire whether the former testimony was
given upon such an issue that the party opponent in that case
had the same interest and motive in his cross-examination that
the present opponent has." Thus privity was used in terms of
identity of interest. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
versed the decision,5 5 and held that the former testimony was in-
admissible as it was a suit between two different parties and
there was no privity of interest between the minor and her
mother. The reason given was that in one case the mother was
trying to recover as a life insurance beneficiary, and in the other
the minor was seeking compensation under the workmen's com-
pensation laws. The minor did not have the benefit of cross-,
examining the witness. Therefore the Supreme Court seems to
have adopted the position that privity does not include substan-
tial interest and motive.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence provide that it will be suf-
ficient if the issues and parties are such that the adverse party
53. 38 So.2d 400 (La. App. 1949).
54. 349 Mo. 13, 17, 160 S.W.2d 740, 745 (1942).
55. Williams v. Jahncke Service, 217 La. 1078, 48 So.2d 93 (1950).
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on the former occasion had the right and opportunity for cross-
examination with an interest and motive similar to that of the
later opponent. 5 Thus the Uniform Rules seem to follow the
Bartlett case, extending privity to include similar interest and
motive.
It is submitted that the present Louisiana position with re-
spect to identity of parties should be retained. This position
seems to better safeguard the opportunity for cross-examina-
tion.
Confrontation. The Sixth Amendment to the United States
Constitution57 requires that "in all criminal prosecutions, the ac-
cused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." The question of the application of this provision
to the states has not been finally settled by the United States
Supreme Court.58  However, the Louisiana Constitution5 9 pro-
vides that "the accused in every instance shall have the right to
be confronted with the witnesses against him." Nevertheless,
the cases both in Louisiana and at common law allow former
testimony without present confrontation. The Louisiana court
in State v. Banks6 ° announced that the right of confrontation is
satisfied if the right, coupled with the opportunity of cross-
examination, is extended during a preliminary hearing or former
trial. The fact that at a subsequent trial the witnesses are un-
available does not render their prior testimony inadmissible.
The Uniform Rules of Evidence contain no provision on con-
frontation, but the comments thereto make it clear that the com-
missioners wish the rules to have the widest possible effect con-
sistent with constitutional provisions." Of course any Louisiana
statute on the admissibility of former testimony would have to
recognize the constitutional requirement of confrontation. How-
56. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(3). The Uniform Rules also treat
identity of parties and identity of issues as the same.
57. U.S. CONST. amend. VI: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial -and to be confronted with the wit-
nesses against him."
58. See Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164 (1906) ; Schwab v. Berggren, 143
U.S. 442 (1892). See also U.S. CONST. - REVISED AND ANNOTATED BY GOVERN-
MENT I'RINTINO OFFICE 1126 (1952).
59. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9: "In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have
the right . . . , to be confronted with the witnesses against him."
LA. R.S. 15:365 (1950) : "The accused shall have the right to be confronted
with the witnesses against him."
60. 111 La. 22, 35 So. 370 (1903).
61. ULA UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE -OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS
63 (1953).
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ever, it seems that this requirement would be satisfied if the de-
fendant actually confronted the witnesses at some former trial
or preliminary hearing and had the right of cross-examination.
Conclusion
Former testimony is admissible as an exception to the hear-
say rule when certain elements are present. These elements may
be briefly summarized as follows: (1) unavailability of the wit-
ness; (2) a former tribunal with the power to subpoena wit-
nesses, administer oaths, and allow cross-examination; (3) testi-
mony under oath or a legally sufficient affirmation; (4) oppor-
tunity for cross-examination at the former proceeding; (5) iden-
tity of issues; and (6) identity of parties. Complete reciprocity
of parties is not required in Louisiana and generally at common
law. In a criminal case the accused must be confronted with the
witnesses against him, but the courts hold that this requirement
is satisfied when the accused was confronted by the witnesses at
the former proceedings. The only one of the above elements
which appears to present a substantial problem is identity of
parties. The Louisiana Supreme Court still requires that the per-
son against whom the testimony was offered must have been the
same in both suits or there must have been privity in blood, law,
or estate. Recent common law cases and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence require only that the person against whom the testi-
mony was offered in the prior proceeding have an interest and
motive similar to that of the opponent in the subsequent pro-
ceeding.
Sam J. Friedman
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